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1Realistic Exchange Rates:
A Post-Asian Financial Crisis Perspective
Lok Sang HO
Lingnan University
1. Introduction
Just about everyone is concerned about currency crises.  Currency
crises can ruin enterprises, destroy jobs, cause inflation, send interest
rates sky-high, and arbitrarily and unfairly redistribute wealth.
Innocent people get hurt.  Life savings can be lost.  Even governments
may fall.  The Asian Financial Crisis has forcefully put the message
across: currency crises can shatter lives and topple governments.
There does not seem to be anything that could be worse than a full-
blown currency crisis.
Some economists have tried to come up with “early warning
systems” that can raise alarm before crises strike (Kaminsky et. al.
1997 and Chote (ed.), 1998).  Perhaps the size of the current account
deficit relative to the GDP, perhaps the size of the government budget
deficit--perhaps some other indicators such as the country’s degree of
dependency on short-term foreign debt, could serve the purpose.  Apart
from such early warning systems, some economists have provided
their own definitions of what constitute a currency crisis.  Some say
that if the exchange rate should fluctuate beyond a certain range one
could say a crisis has occurred.  But it appears that such systems are not
of much use.  On any of these counts Hong Kong, for example, has
neither been vulnerable to a currency crisis nor has faced any crisis at
all.  But Hong Kong is widely believed to have suffered greatly from
the currency attack that it endured in 1997 and 1998.  Officially at least,
Hong Kong’s unprecedented recession of 5.3 per cent in 1998 was due
to the Asian Financial Crisis1.  Hong Kong’s overnight inter-bank
lending rate briefly breached 280 per cent on 23 October 1997 on the
back of a massive attack on the Hong Kong dollar, which sent the stock
market plunging.  The crux of the crisis was that people did not believe
that the prevailing exchange rate could hold.
                                                
1 For an alternative explanation, see Ho (2000), Chapter 18.
2I would define a true currency crisis as a situation in which the
prevailing exchange rate has lost credibility and tension has
developed in the financial market and in the economy.  To avoid
exchange rate crises, the exchange rate has to be at a level that is
credible.  A credible exchange rate is such that it is consistent with full
employment and balance of payments equilibrium over the long term.
Clearly an excessively high exchange rate erodes the country’s
competitiveness and unemployment may ensue.  Clearly the exchange
rate cannot hold if the country keeps losing its foreign exchange
reserves.  In the short run, however, because of speculative pressures,
perhaps triggered by the contagion, market players may sell the
currency in huge volume thus creating pressure for it to depreciate.
Such short term selling need not however undermine the current
exchange rate’s long term credibility if the country’s foreign
exchange earnings match its foreign exchange payments.  As long as
the latter is the case and the exchange rate is consistent with full
employment, I would say the current exchange rate is inherently
defendable.  Even though there may be an appearance of a currency
crisis there is no true crisis.  I will call such situations “apparent
crises.”  Whereas the currency should devalue when there is a true
crisis devaluation is not warranted under apparent crises.  Not only
should the central bank not devalue the currency, but it also must not
raise interest rates to fend off the short-term selling.  Since the
currency is defendable it should be defended.  There is a third kind of
currency crisis which I call “disguised currency crisis.”  There need
not be market pressures for the currency to devalue.  Indeed quite the
reverse may be true.  A currency may become increasingly
overvalued due to market pressures, to the extent that the exchange
rate becomes incompatible with full employment.  Thus,
overvaluations may occur under a regime of linking with a host
currency as well as under a regime of floating exchange rate.
The next section will examine two cases of “true currency crisis.”
I argue that currency crises need not be a result of excessive short-term
borrowing, lack of fiscal discipline, excessive money supply growth,
or crony capitalism.  While any of these factors, acting on its own or in
conjunction with others, will erode investors’ confidence and prompt a
currency crisis, perfectly “straight economies” could also run into
trouble.  Hong Kong is a case in point.  Hong Kong’s currency crisis in
31997 belongs to the true crisis category even though it was well
behaved fiscally and its financial institutions followed all the basic
rules of prudence.  The Thai baht debacle, on the other hand, provides a
case of true currency crisis arising from excessive short-term
borrowing coupled with a link to the US dollar.
Section III will examine two cases of apparent currency crises.
The Malaysian and the Singapore economies were hit by currency
devaluation pressures in 1997, not withstanding strong economic
fundamentals and a dearth of evidence that their currencies were
grossly overvalued.
Section IV will present the Japanese yen as a case of disguised
currency crisis.  The yen has been floating all along and pressures had
been for it to appreciate rather than depreciate.  Yet it had, over the
years, appreciated to such levels that its economy stagnated.
What all this means is that neither a floating exchange rate
regime —with or without bands, nor a fixed exchange rate regime,
will free us from the threat of currency crises.  Section V, the
conclusions, argue that it is in the interest of the international financial
community to maintain exchange rates at the sustainable or
defendable rates.  A concerted effort, through a mechanism fully
supported by all the world’s major economies, should be made to
protect such exchange rates.
2. The Hong Kong Case vs. the Thai Case
It is obvious that Hong Kong was under great stress during the
Asian Financial Crisis.  The Forward Exchange Rate for the US dollar
in terms of the Hong Kong dollar showed a huge premium — over
6000 points for the 12 month contract in January 1998.  That is,
whereas HK$7.75 converted to one US dollar in the spot market, the
market expected that in a year’s time more than HK$8.3 would be
needed to buy one US dollar.  Along with such expectations for the
HK dollar to depreciate, interest rates in Hong Kong went up
dramatically.  As interest rates went up, the stock market went down.
During the week ending on October 23, 1997, the stock market lost
23.34 per cent of its value.  As Table 1 shows, pressures on the Hong
Kong dollar lingered on through 1998, but by March 1998 they had
eased considerably.
4Table 1: Forward Exchange Rate as Compared with the Spot Exchange Rate, Hong Kong
Daily- Middle Rate (HKD
against
USD)
Spot 1-month 3-month 6-month 9-month 1-year
15-Oct-1997 7.7385 90 280 535 800 1000
17-Oct-1997 7.7400 90 295 565 850 1125
20-Oct-1997 7.7420 145 445 825 1150 1400
21-Oct-1997 7.7475 265 750 1500 1850 2250
22-Oct-1997 7.7475 550 1350 1650 2950 3750
23-Oct-1997 7.6900 1550 2950 4050 4900 6000
24-Oct-1997 7.6900 1050 1850 2750 3500 4300
27-Oct-1997 7.7305 750 1550 2550 3100 3800
29-Oct-1997 7.7335 400 1000 1950 2700 3200
31-Oct-1997 7.7305 350 1100 2050 2800 3600
3-Nov-1997 7.7325 225 650 1500 2050 2750
10-Nov-1997 7.7325 650 1800 3050 3950 5000
12-Nov-1997 7.7295 575 1600 2700 3550 4500
19-Nov-1997 7.7295 305 1200 2550 3550 4750
21-Nov-1997 7.7305 205 850 2000 3250 4250
28-Nov-1997 7.7303 155 730 1600 2450 3450
3-Dec-1997 7.738 125 750 1850 2650 3650
5-Dec-1997 7.737 80 630 1700 2650 3550
8-Dec-1997 7.7385 48 525 1500 2300 3450
12-Dec-1997 7.7493 260 1000 2400 3800 5000
19-Dec-1997 7.75 65 625 1780 3050 4050
24-Dec-1997 7.75 65 625 1900 3350 4450
31-Dec-1997 7.75 95 655 1850 3100 4150
5-Jan-1998 7.75 195 900 2250 3650 4950
7-Jan-1998 7.7345 255 1000 2500 3850 5250
9-Jan-1998 7.747 580 1650 3250 5050 6800
14-Jan-1998 7.744 500 1400 2750 4050 5800
19-Jan-1998 7.74075 495 1400 2950 4450 5950
23-Jan-1998 7.738 245 1175 2750 4250 6050
26-Jan-1998 7.7422 325 1300 2950 4550 6150
2-Feb-1998 7.738 165 780 2050 3550 4850
6-Feb-1998 7.7375 100 655 1650 2750 4150
11-Feb-1998 7.739 45 425 1350 2300 3400
16-Feb-1998 7.7395 110 650 1750 2950 4150
20-Feb-1998 7.746 65 465 1100 2550 3300
25-Feb-1998 7.7465 30 345 1020 1800 2850
2-Mar-1998 7.7438 25 295 920 1650 2450
6-Mar-1998 7.744 70 445 1200 2050 2950
9-Mar-1998 7.74355 65 410 1150 2000 2950
13-Mar-1998 7.7455 43 335 1050 1850 2850
19-Mar-1998 7.748 2.5 175 750 1400 2300
23-Mar-1998 7.74875 15 87.5 540 1050 1700
25-Mar-1998 7.748 14.5 120 625 1250 2000
30-Mar-1998 7.7463 2.5 130 625 1200 1900
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority
5Why was the Hong Kong dollar subjected to so much selling
pressures?  The world certainly knows well that Hong Kong has about
the world’s biggest foreign exchange and fiscal reserves in per capita
terms.  Hong Kong has no official foreign debt and only a tiny official
internal debt.  Hong Kong’s bank regulators imposed on its banks
standards that far exceed the Basle capital asset ratio requirements,
and none of its financial institutions was under any imminent risk of
insolvency.  The reason, according to my analysis, is that the market
did not believe that the exchange value of the Hong Kong could
hold — given that the US dollar had appreciated so much against most
other currencies, the HK-US dollar link, and Hong Kong’s recent
inflation history.  The market lost confidence in the Hong Kong dollar
because it believed that without a large devaluation of the currency
Hong Kong’s economy would not be able to compete with others.
Because of the strength of the US currency and given the history of
high inflation, the market had good reason to suspect that the Hong
Kong dollar had to depreciate.  In the end, the dollar did not
depreciate, but Hong Kong went through a painful period of deflation
and adjustment.
Like the Hong Kong dollar, the Thai baht had been informally
linked to the US dollar for quite some time.  Over the years, Thailand
had lost competitiveness because of new competition from the
emerging economies.  It had been falling into debt steadily, and
short-term borrowing from overseas had fuelled an unsustainable real
estate boom.  Meanwhile, its current account deficit had grown bigger
and bigger, while the foreign exchange reserves were becoming
smaller and smaller. The immediate urge to sell the baht, however,
was prompted by the fall of Finance One, the biggest finance
company in the country.  The decision to devalue the baht on July 2
1997 was first welcome by the financial markets.  The stock market
actually rose almost 8 per cent this day, showing that the devaluation
was seen as a positive move to deal with a long-standing problem
realistically.  However, with the foreign exchange reserves down to
dangerous levels, investors continued to be worried, particularly as
the central bank suspended operations of 16 finance companies.  On
August 5 Thailand unveiled an austerity plan in line with IMF
recommendations and suspended another 48 finance companies.
The Hong Kong dollar and the Thai baht were attacked for
6different reasons.  In the former case it was because the US dollar link
had taken the HK dollar exchange rate to increasingly incredible
levels, particularly given the devaluations of other Asian currencies.
In the latter case it was because of gross weakness in economic
fundamentals.  In the end, however, the central banks of both
economies panicked and raised interest rates to unprecedented levels,
bringing ruinous effects across the entire economy.  Ultimately, Hong
Kong had to face a period of painful deflation, while Thailand had to
struggle with cleaning up its financial mess.
3. Malaysia and Singapore
Malaysia and Singapore were innocent victims of the contagion.
Although Malaysia in 1996 had a current account deficit at 4.6 per
cent of its GNP, this represented a big improvement over 1995, when
the current account deficit was as high as 10.2 per cent of the GNP.
The gross savings rate was maintained at the high level of about 40
per cent, while inflation was mild.  Singapore had an ongoing and
growing current account surplus since 1988, and had an even higher
savings rate.  Singapore also boasts one of the world’s highest per
capita foreign exchange reserves.
Based on the economic fundamentals, neither countries had a
need to depreciate their currencies dramatically.  However, to
maintain their competitiveness when other currencies in the region
had depreciated it makes sense for them to depreciate relative to the
US dollar.  A larger depreciation than this would be unnecessary.  This
tactic was followed by Singapore, which allowed its exchange rate to
depreciate from 1.4305 S$ to the US dollar on July 1 1997 to 1.6755
S$ to the US dollar by year-end — a decline of 15.48 per cent.  The
prime lending rate was not raised until November 1997 and it peaked
at 7.79 per cent through August 1998 and then was reduced decisively
to 5.9 per cent by the end of 1998.  Malaysia had much more humble
reserves and depreciated much more and raised interest rates much
more to defend the ringit.  The base lending rate offered by the
commercial banks when up to 12.27 per cent by mid 1998 from about
10 per cent in 1997.  The average lending rate offered by merchant
banks was 18.71 per cent by the end of January 1998.  It was only in
September 1998 after capital controls had been imposed, that interest
7rates started to decline noticeably.  The high interest rates and the
capital controls cost the Malaysian economy much growth.  Real
GDP declined 7.5 per cent in 1998.  In contrast, Singapore’s GDP
growth, at 0.4 per cent, though down significantly from 8.4 per cent
the previous year, remained positive in 1998.
The judgement that the currency crises suffered by Singapore and
Malaysia were not warranted is vindicated by the big current account
surpluses of the two countries after the devaluations.  Singapore’s
current account surplus jumped 40 per cent in 1998, to 25.4 per cent
of the GDP.  Malaysia’s current account showed a surplus equal to
13.7 per cent of the GDP in 1998, which rose further to 16.9 per cent
of the GDP in 1999.  As it happened, Malaysia never accepted any aid
from the IMF.  The economy bounced back 5.4 per cent in 1999 and is
expected to register a 5.8 per cent growth in 2000.
4. Japan: A Case of Disguised Currency Crisis
On appearance, Japan had no currency crisis.  People do not speak
of a currency crisis if the currency is subject to appreciation pressures
prompted by strong current account surpluses.  However, Japan’s
economy has been battered by the strength of the yen.  The formation
of the property price bubble is a direct result of the accumulation of
huge amounts of savings.  The subsequent burst of the bubble and the
insolvency of many Japanese banks that followed were the direct
results of the strength of the yen which is itself predicated on the
strong current account balance.
As Ho (2000) explained, Japan’s high savings rate is actually very
much the source of its economic woes.  “If the Japanese had
consumed more, it would not have so much money to pump into real
estate.  The current account surplus would not have been so big.  The
yen would not have been so strong.  And the asset price bubble would
not have formed, let alone burst.”
On the eve of the global stock market crash in 1987, the Nikkei
index, fuelled by strong savings, had already breached the historical
high of 26,000.  Yet portfolio diversification considerations suggest
that it would make sense to put some of the new savings in the stock
market, some money in real estate, and some money on overseas
assets.  The continued accumulation of savings pushed the Nikkei
8Index and property values higher and higher (Table 2).  By the end of
1989 the Nikkei was close to 39,000.  When the yen hit a new high in
1991, however, it became apparent that it made less and less sense to
put more money into the domestic stock market and the domestic
property market.  Interest in acquiring Japanese assets reversed.  Yet,
thanks to an efficient manufacturing sector and a highly successful
export effort, notwithstanding large capital outflows, the yen broke
through historical highs.  Between 1990 and 1995, the yen-dollar
exchange rate moved from a low of 160 yen to the dollar to a high of
around 80 yen to the dollar.  As the yen appreciated, home assets,
which are denominated in yen became even more expensive.  The
incentive to sell increases while the incentive to buy disappears.  No
wonder property prices and stock prices nose-dived.  A couple of
months after the yen’s US dollar exchange rate peaked at around 80
yen to the dollar in April 1995, the Nikkei had fallen below 15000.
The land price index had also been shaved by half.  Commercial land
was particularly hard hit.  About 60 per cent of the peak value was
lost.
While domestic asset prices plummeted, the value of overseas
assets also declined in yen terms as the yen continued to appreciate
against the foreign currencies.  Because Japan is a net creditor nation,
by definition Japan has more foreign-currency denominated assets
and foreign currency-denominated liabilities.  Appreciation of the yen
hurt the balance sheets of Japan’s business sector, and indirectly those
of Japan’s banks even if the latter were prudent enough to ensure that
their own foreign liabilities match with their foreign assets.
9Table 2: Asset prices and exchange rates in Japan 1984-1997
Year Stock Price Index Property Price
Index
Exchange Rate
Yen/$
Economic
Growth
1997 15258.7 44.9 129.9 1.4
1996 19361.3 48.6 116.0 5.1
1995@ 19868.1 54.7 102.9 1.5
1994 19723.1 63.2 99.8 0.6
1993 17417.2 71.4 111.9 0.3
1992 16924.9 87.0 124.6 1.0
1991### 22983.8 103.0 125.2 3.8
1990## 23848.7 100.0 135.4 5.1
1989# 38915.9 76.9 143.4 4.8
1988 30159.0 61.8 125.9 6.2
1987 21564.0 48.3 138.5 4.2
1986 18701.3 38.4 160.1 2.9
1985 13113.3 33.6 200.6 4.4
1984 11542.6 31.3 251.6 3.9
Source: Bank of Japan
Data for the Land Price Index is for comprehensive use in 6 major cities and is
cited from Statistics of Japan 1998 published by the Statistical Bureau of Japan.
Note: Stock price indices are for end of the month at end of the year; the land
price indices are average values for the year.
# 1989 saw the stock market hit the peak and the yen hit a trough
## 1990 saw the property market jumping following the sharp surge in the
stock market the previous year.
### 1991 saw the yen rising to a nearly all time high having reversed a brief
depreciation against the dollar in 1989.  Property prices peaked.
@ April 1995 saw the yen touching 80 yen to the dollar, then weakened
rapidly.  The weakening of the yen triggered a dramatic rise in stock
prices that lasted about a year.
Why did the stock market bubble burst in 1990 and the property
price bubble burst in 1991 is not an easy question to answer.  Ito and
Iwaisako (1995) could not find a valid explanation for the stock price
increase in the second half of 1989 and the land price increase in 1990
using any asset pricing model based on fundamentals or rational
bubbles.  The evidence does show, however, that exchange
movements certainly played some role.  We know that stock prices are
much more sensitive to emerging economic trends and they tend to
lead property prices and turns in the macro-economy.  The yen’s
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depreciation in 1989 increased the attractiveness of Japanese assets
and triggered a boom in asset prices.  It also slowed the outflow of
Japanese capital.  The excessive stock price increase, coupled with the
realization that the yen’s depreciation in 1989 was only a temporary
blip triggered a sell-off in 1990.  The sharp declines in the stock
market in turn aggravated the property sell-off in 1991.
One would ask why in the long years of secular appreciation of
the yen, from 360 to the dollar early 1971, through around 125 yen to
the dollar in 1988, nothing serious happened.  The evidence is quite
clear that during these years Japan had invested aggressively in
enhancing its productivity and overseas.  Through such investments,
it managed to preserve its competitiveness so that the manufacturing
sector was still going strong in 1988, notwithstanding an already
strong yen.  Over the years, however, the accumulation of savings and
the absence of alternative instruments of investment inevitably took
domestic asset prices to higher and higher levels.  On the back of such
price gains, yen appreciation really made it attractive to sell Japanese
assets.  The result is a trail of bad debts, bank failures, and a stagnant
economy.
Historically, the “super strength” of currencies has always spelled
disaster for economies.  Hong Kong in 1985 was on the verge of a
recession because the US dollar to which it was linked was so strong.
The UK economy on the eve of the sterling crisis of 1992 also
suffered serious unemployment and fiscal deficits for the same reason.
The paradox is that a freely floating exchange rate does not guarantee
that the exchange rate would be at a level compatible with both
internal balance(full employment and fiscal balance) and external
balance(balance of payments equilibrium).  While a linked exchange
rate may become overvalued relative to what is needed for internal
balance & external balance by virtue of the strength of the host
currency, a floating exchange rate may become overvalued for
internal balance by virtue of massive capital inflows or massive
current account surplus.
5. Conclusions
All the above suggests that neither floating exchange rate nor
fixed exchange rate will protect us from currency crises.  Various
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innovations, including the crawling peg or the idea of an optimal band
for exchange rate movement, are really beside the point unless the
exchange rate is consistent with the requirements for full employment
and macroeconomic stability and is able to hold its place.
Paradoxically, in the short term our globalised capital markets may not
allow such stability-compatible exchange rate to hold its place.
Because of nervousness, herd behavior, or some temporary shocks, the
market could bring about an exchange rate way below what is
warranted.  Hong Kong in 1983 just prior to the introduction of the
linked exchange rate system had seen such a scenario, with the Hong
Kong dollar falling to about $10 to the US dollar.  The Indonesian
rupiah fell below 15000 rupiah to the dollar in June 1998, before rising
back to about 8000 rupiah to the dollar by year-end.  Mirroring the
decline in the exchange value of the rupiah, inflation shot up, to over
80 per cent in August, September, and October 1998.  Similarly recent
declines in the value of the Euro was causing the specter of high
inflation.  Such exchange rates are inconsistent with economic stability,
contribute to run-away inflation, and engender social instability.
People normally do not refer to a strong currency as under crisis.
But if the strength of the currency is sapping the health of the
economy it is really the source of an economic crisis.  The strength of
the yen has cost the country a decade’s growth.  Fiscal measures to
stimulate the economy and save the banks only led to fiscal deficits as
much as 10 per cent of the GDP.  Such ratios are widely regarded as
unsustainable and unacceptable, and it is more than 3 times the
threshold limit allowed under the Maastricht Treaty for European
currencies to join the monetary union.
To conclude, there are exchange rates that are needed for economic
stability and the world has to act together to bring them about because
the market will not automatically bring them about.  Fixed exchange
rates, floating exchange rates, crawling pegs, floating bands all will not
suffice. What is needed is analysis and understanding of what
exchange rates are compatible with stability of the financial markets
and the economy.  What is needed is a global effort to bring these
exchange rates about.  We need a strong IMF, or some other
international body, to do the job.  Knowing what is needed is the first
step to deal with a problem.  Countries in Asia, having suffered a big
blow from the financial crisis, should work together to achieve this.
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